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Cognition in Aristotle’s Poetics*
MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines Aristotle’s understanding of the contributions 
of perceptual and rational cognition to the composition and reception of poetry. 
An initial outline of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology shows that Aristotelian 
perception is sufficiently powerful to sustain very rich, complex patterns of 
behaviour in human as well as non-human animals, and examines the interaction 
between perception (cognition of the particular and the ‘that’) and the distinctive 
capacity for reason (which makes possible cognition of the universal and the 
‘why’) in human behaviour. The rest of the paper applies this framework to a 
number of problems in the Poetics: (i) If Aristotelian tekhnê is defined as a 
productive disposition involving reason, how can poetic tekhnê be manifested in 
the work of poets who work by non-rational habit or talent? (ii) Why does 
Aristotle believe that the pleasure taken in imitation qua imitation involves 
rational inference? (iii) What does Aristotle mean when he contrasts history 
(concerned with the particular) and poetry (concerned with the universal)? (iv) 
How is Aristotle’s insistence on universality and rationality in the construction 
of poetic plots to be reconciled with his willingness to tolerate irrationalities and 
implausibilities? 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, cognition, perception, poetry, tekhnê, history 
This paper examines Aristotle’s views on the cognitive demands which poetry 
makes on poets and their audiences. The examination will not focus exclusively 
on cognition in the limited sense of rational inference or insight. Aristotle regards 
perception as a form of cognition (gnôsis),1 and I use the term in a 
correspondingly inclusive sense. Humans are rational animals; their rationality is 
inextricable from the embodied perceptual capacities that they share (to a greater 
or lesser degree) with other animals.2 It is self-evident that the appreciation of 
poetry has a perceptual basis: a contemporary of Aristotle who could neither see 
nor hear would have had no cognitive access to poetry at all. But it would be a 
mistake to assume that perception provides no more than a bare interface to texts 
or performances of poetry, leaving all the significant cognitive work to the 
 
* This paper’s completion was made possible by an award under the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council’s Research Leave scheme (grant reference AH/D501210/1), with additional support from 
the University of Leeds. Seminars in Nottingham, Leeds, and Royal Holloway provided an 
opportunity to try out some of the material; I am grateful to the audiences for comments and 
encouragement, and also to the journal’s anonymous referee, whose observations helped me to 
clarify my thinking at a number of points.  
1 APo. 2.19, 99b37-9; Mem. 1, 450a9-12; GA 1.23, 731a33f.; Met. 1.1, 981b11f. Note also the 
contrast between what is more gnôrimos to us (perceptible) and more gnôrimos in itself 
(intelligible): APo. 1.2, 71b33-72a5; Phys. 1.1, 184a16-26; 1.5, 189a5-8.  
2 Intellect (nous) thinks in phantasmata (DA 1.1, 403a8-10; 3.7, 431a14-17, 431b2; 3.8, 432a7-
14); and processes of inferential reasoning are underpinned by ‘logistic’ or ‘deliberative’ phantasia 
(DA 3.10, 433b29; 3.11, 434a5-10). Phantasia is a function of the embodied perceptual faculty 
(see §1 below); so, although intellect is not embodied (DA 2.2, 413b24-29; 3.4, 429a10-29), its 
exercise by humans does depend on their embodied perceptual capacities.  
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intellect. Aristotle has a richer understanding of the powers of perception, and the 
interplay between different levels of human cognitive capacity in the composition 
and reception of poetry is unlikely to be simple. The first section of the paper 
provides an introductory outline of Aristotle’s thinking on perception, reason and 
their interrelation. The following sections consider the implications of Aristotle’s 
cognitive psychology for his views on the nature of poetic tekhnê; the role of 
rational inference in the response to imitations; and the comparison of history and 
poetry, together with the role of universality and illusion in poetry. 
1. Aristotelian cognition  
The richness of Aristotle’s concept of perception is rooted in his zoological 
perspective. An animal is a living organism that can move itself, and that has 
sense-perception. Those two facts are linked: the biological function of perception 
is to enable animals to manage their interaction with the environment in a way 
that promotes survival and well-being.3 Aristotle was aware that many animals 
interact with their environment in sophisticated and adaptable ways; he goes so far 
as to describe some animals as clever or intelligent.4 However, since Aristotle 
denies that any non-human animal has the capacity for reason, this intelligence is 
no more than analogous to human rationality (HA 8.1, 588a28-31). It is based 
entirely on the animals’ perceptual capacities. Aristotle is therefore obliged to give 
an account of perception that is rich enough to explain the intelligence manifested 
in animal behaviour.  
Some things can be perceived only by one sense: for example, colour is an 
object of perception that is special to sight. By contrast, shape can be perceived by 
sight or by touch; shape is an object of perception that is common to these two 
sense modalities (DA 2.6, 418a7-20). An account of perception that was limited to 
the special and common objects of perception would not have the necessary 
explanatory power, since colours and shapes and sounds as such do not motivate 
animal behaviour. But think of a lion that hears an ox lowing: it perceives a sound; 
it also perceives dinner. In Aristotle’s terminology, the ox as dinner is perceived 
incidentally (DA 2.6, 418a20-24; NE 3.10, 1118a16-23). It is not the perception of 
sound as such that motivates the lion, but the incidental perception of dinner.5  
Perception discriminates: it enables animals to distinguish one kind of thing 
from another, as the lion can distinguish potential prey from a potential mate. As 
                                                 
3 DA 3.12, 434b11-27; 3.13, 435b19-25; Sens. 1, 436b10-437a3. Even sessile animals need, at the 
minimum, the sense of touch if they are to react appropriately to direct contact: DA 3.12, 434b11-
18; cf. e.g. HA 1.1, 487b9-11 (sponges). 
4 E.g. HA 9.7, 612b18-31; 9.5, 611a15-30; 9.10, 614b18-30; 9.39, 623a7-26; 9.46, 630b18-21. 
Relevant references are conveniently tabulated in Coles (1997), 320-3; see also Foster (1997). 
Charles Darwin, similarly, attributed intelligence to earthworms in view of their flexible behaviour 
in plugging burrow entrances: Darwin (1881), 64-98; discussion in Crist (2002). 
5 Cashdollar (1973). At DA 2.6, 418a20-4, Aristotle’s example of an incidental object of perception 
is ‘son of Diares’. He would appreciate the results of the playback experiments reported in Cheney 
and Seyfarth (1980): on hearing a particular juvenile’s distress call, vervet monkeys tend to look 
towards that individual’s mother. In Aristotelian terms, they hear the sound, and incidentally 
perceive ‘so-and-so’s offspring’; so they expect a reaction from the mother.  
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that example suggests, perception also evaluates: it relates things to the animal’s 
goals.6 The lion perceives dinner and is pleased (NE 3.10, 1118a20-22). The ox 
perceives a diner and is distressed. Those pleasant or distressing perceptions have 
built into them the motivations to react appropriately, by pursuit or avoidance. 
Perception is capable of explaining animal movement, precisely because 
perception and desire are linked: the perceptual capacity entails the capacity for 
desire (DA 2.2, 413b21-4; 2.3, 414b1-7). The capacity for desire is not, in fact, 
distinct from the perceptual capacity (DA 3.7, 431a10-14).7  
The lion’s perception of prospective dinner will continue to guide its 
movements between hearing the ox lowing and its coming into view. For 
perception leaves persisting traces in the animal, which Aristotle calls 
phantasmata, ‘images’ (DA 3.3, 428b30-9a6).8 The faculty of phantasia is the 
same as the perceptual faculty (Insomn. 1, 459a14-22); so the reach of the 
perceptual faculty extends beyond what is currently being perceived. Phantasia 
supplies a variety of psychological processes with perceptual information that has 
accumulated (and often been modified) within the animal. One obvious and 
important example of the role of phantasia is memory (Mem. 1, 449b30-451a17). 
So it is thanks, in part, to phantasia that squirrels can retrieve the nuts they have 
cached.9  
Storing and retrieving nuts is a fixed behaviour pattern for squirrels. But some 
animals are more adaptable; they can learn from the accumulation of past 
perceptions in the deeper sense that their behavioural repertoire is modified by 
experience (empeiria). The fact that animals can be taught, by humans or by 
conspecifics, provides one illustration of this adaptability (HA 9.1, 608a17-21; 
9.3, 610b33f.; 9.7, 612b31; 9.15, 616b11; 9.46, 630b20; PA 2.17, 660b1). 
Experience, a form of cognition (gnôsis: Met. 1.1, 981a15f.) which arises from the 
integration of multiple memories (APo. 2.19, 100a3-6; Met. 1.1, 980a27-981a1), 
is the final element in the explanatory power of the perceptual system in 
Aristotle’s theory.10  
Incidental perception, phantasia and experience are all perceptually mediated 
capacities, and do not depend on reason; they are available, in varying degrees, to 
non-human animals.11 They are also available to humans. The capacity for reason 
                                                 
6 In view of the shared biological orientation, it is not a coincidence that Aristotle’s example calls 
to mind the concept of ‘affordance’ in Gibson’s ecological theory of perception. See Gibson 
(1979), 127-43 (e.g. 128: ‘The other animals afford, above all, a rich and complex set of 
interactions, sexual, predatory, nurturing, fighting, playing, cooperating, and communicating’). Cf. 
Reed (1989); Gibson and Pick (2000).  
7 Whiting (2002). 
8 Osborne (2000); Lorenz (2006), 113-201. 
9 Squirrels are not wholly dependent on memory: they opportunistically exploit caches revealed by 
perceptual (especially olfactory) cues. But there is evidence that the ability to remember the 
locations in which they have cached food is also important: Jacobs and Liman (1991); Devenport, 
Luna and Devenport (2000). 
10 LaBarge (2006); Gregorić and Grgić (2006).   
11 Some deny empeiria to non-human animals; e.g. Tsitsiridis (2005), 441: ‘it becomes entirely 
clear that empeiria pertains exclusively to humans and to none of the other species’. But Met. 1.1, 
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decisively differentiates humans from other animals, but it does not monopolise 
human cognition. Indeed, Aristotle stresses that the human behavioural repertoire 
is far more open to modification by habit than that of any other animal; experience 
has correspondingly more explanatory power in the case of humans (Met. 1.1, 
980b26f.; cf. Pol. 7.13, 1332a38-b11). Mature humans therefore have perceptually 
based capacities that are distinguishable in degree from those of other animals,12 
as well as their categorically distinctive capacity for rationality. Reason does not 
supersede this shared endowment, but adds to, interacts with and partially 
transforms it.13
Aristotle distinguishes perception from rational understanding (epistêmê) by 
relating the former to particulars and the latter to universals (APo. 1.31, 87b28-
88a7; Phys. 1.5, 189a5-8; DA 2.5, 417b21-3). A related distinction, no less 
important, is between the ‘that’ (to hoti) and the ‘why’ (to dihoti, to dia ti). The 
‘that’ is the realm of observable fact, which is accessible to perception; the ‘why’ 
is the intelligibility of the facts (APo. 1.2, 71b9-16; 1.13, 79a2-6). Humans share 
with other animals the capacity for perceptual cognition of particulars and the 
‘that’; but the capacity to understand the universal and the ‘why’ depends on 
reason, and so gives humans a distinctive kind of cognitive access to the world.14
One consequence of the capacity to grasp the ‘why’ and universals is that 
humans can engage in inferential reasoning (sullogismos). Whereas other animals 
are dependent on the spontaneous results of the interaction of phantasmata, 
humans can manipulate phantasmata in a process of directed search (zêtêsis: NE 
3.3, 1112b20-23; 6.9, 1142a31-b2, b13-15; Mem. 2, 453a9-14; Phys. 2.8, 
199a20f.). For example, some non-human animals have memory: traces of past 
perceptions are preserved within them, and can come to mind and influence their 
behaviour. But this coming-to-mind is involuntary: the animal is passive. By 
contrast, humans can remember in the sense of actively calling something to 
mind. Only humans can do this, because it involves an inferential process (Mem. 
2, 453a4-13; HA 1.1, 488b24-6). Similarly, only humans are capable of 
deliberation, in which an agent reasons back from a goal to the actions required to 
implement that goal (ta pros ta telê: NE 3.3, 1112b11-15, 33f.). Since the goal is 
the ‘why’ of the action, in the sense of its final cause, this is a form of causal 
reasoning. Non-human animals and human children do not understand causes 
(that is, they have no understanding of the ‘why’); and because they cannot 
engage in causal reasoning, they cannot deliberate (EE 2.10, 1226b21-29). 
                                                                                                                                     
980b26f. explicitly attributes empeiria to some animals (though to a small degree, relative to 
humans). See further LaBarge (2006), 27 n.3. 
12 Humans are not always superior in this comparison: DA 2.9, 421a7-16; GA 5.2, 781b17f.  
13 The most obvious transformation is that in humans the non-rational part of the soul is also in a 
sense rational, since it can be responsive to reason (NE 1.13, 11-2b30-3a2; EE 2.1, 1219b26-32). 
See further n.18 below. 
14 For the nature of the connection between the ‘why’ and the universal, see n.42 below. It is worth 
noting that, although Aristotle generally uses epistêmê in this restricted sense, his terminology is 
(as always) flexible: NE 1147b15-17 speaks of perceptual epistêmê (αἰσθητικὴ ἐπιστήμη) as well 
as epistêmê in the strict sense (ἡ κυρίως ἐπιστήμη); APo. 1.12, 78a22-8 speaks of epistêmê of the 
‘that’ as well as the ‘why’. 
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There is a striking parallel to Aristotle’s distinction between the ‘that’ and the 
‘why’ in modern comparative psychology. One leading primatologist has argued 
that the ability to ‘understand why events occur the way they do’ is unique to 
humans, and is not found even in other primates.15 This position is controversial; 
researchers studying chimpanzees in the wild tend to reach more generous 
conclusions about their cognitive capacities, even to the extent of talking about an 
understanding of causality.16 Aristotle would baulk at that: to speak of an 
understanding of causality suggests an understanding of the ‘why’. Nevertheless, 
he would have sympathy with the field-workers’ generous view of animals’ 
cognitive capacities: we have already noted his respect for animal intelligence. 
His idea is not that non-human animals are cognitively crude because they lack 
reason, but that an impressive degree of cognitive sophistication is possible even 
without reason. Perception and habit are enough to sustain very rich, complex 
patterns of behaviour in non-human animals. As we shall see, perception and habit 
are enough to sustain very rich, complex patterns of behaviour in humans, too. 
Reason massively extends the cognitive reach of humans, but even humans can 
reach a long way on the basis of perception and its sediment, experience.  
To be capable of reason is a godlike attribute (PA 4.10, 686a27-9; NE 10.7, 
1177a13-1b). But the actual exercise of human rationality is in many cases 
completely trivial. Imagine a human being and a laboratory animal working with 
the same experimental apparatus. Both discover, through trial and error, that 
operating a lever produces food; accordingly, both will operate the lever when 
they are hungry. The human may engage in a simple form of deliberation: I wish 
to satisfy my hunger; operating the lever produces food; so I shall operate the 
lever. By contrast, the animal achieves the same result without rational 
understanding; its behaviour will be driven, in Aristotle’s view, by the pleasant 
anticipation of food which experience has linked to the lever’s operation. In its 
simplest manifestations, therefore, the behavioural output of human reasoning 
may be identical to that of an animal’s perception-based responses.17 Reasoning is 
not in itself intellectually demanding: any human who engages in deliberated 
action has engaged in reasoning about the ‘why’. The human capacity for 
rationality can sustain great depth of thought; but it is also at the disposal of the 
least philosophical (Poet. 4, 1448b13-15).  
                                                 
15 Povinelli (2000), 339: ‘Such a specialization may have left the human species in the position of 
constructing explanations for why we (and others) do what we do, and why the world operates the 
way it does—an ability not present in other species.’ Cf. Tomasello and Call (1997), 389: ‘Our 
hypothesis is that nonhuman primates understand causal relations only in the sense of one external 
event typically leads to another (the events are seen as ordered and therefore predictable), but they 
do not understand why one event leads to another.’  
16 Boesch and Boesch-Achermann (1999), 233: ‘the understanding of cause and effect allows 
chimpanzees to mentally anticipate their actions and to choose tools adapted to specific purposes. 
The understanding of causality is the ability to understand the dynamic relations between objects 
when external forces affect them.’ For an overview of the debate see Gómez (2004), 94-123. 
17 MA 7, 701a28-33: in unreflective human action, or in animal behaviour, perception or phantasia 
can provide the connection between a goal (e.g. satisfying thirst) and the desire that initiates 
action, taking the place that a premise would have in deliberative reasoning.  
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The man in the experimental apparatus may not need to deliberate: in such a 
simple situation, he might act to achieve his goal as unreflectively as the animal. 
If he does deliberate, he reasons from his goal (satisfying his hunger) to the means 
necessary to realise that goal (operating the lever); the goal, as we have seen, is 
the ‘why’ of the means, in the sense of the final cause. But since the workings of 
the apparatus are concealed from him, he does not know why this way of 
achieving his goal works; he only knows, from experience, that it does. He does 
not need to know why it works in order to satisfy his hunger; and even if he does 
wonder why it works, he is unlikely to pursue his quest for causal understanding 
all the way back to the First Unmoved Mover. When human action is not wholly 
unreflective, it will involve causal reasoning of variable, but always limited, 
depth, resting on a perceptual base. However, if perception typically prompts 
humans to exercise their rationality by asking ‘why?’, thinking about the ‘why’ 
has an effect on perception in turn—at the very least, by influencing how we 
direct our attention.18 So we should not think of human activity as cleanly 
separable into perceptually and rationally grounded behaviours; there is a complex 
interaction of perception and reason.  
2. The nature of poetic tekhnê
The Poetics is concerned with the art (tekhnê) of poetry. This poses two 
questions. First, what is poetry? Aristotle does not tell us straight away. He does 
not begin by defining poetry, but after a few lines gives some examples: epic, 
tragedy, comedy, dithyramb (Poet. 1, 1447a13f.).19 A reader new to the Poetics 
would be entitled to start by assuming the sense which the word commonly bore 
in contemporary usage: poetry as metrical composition.20 But Aristotle believes 
that this standard definition of ‘poetry’ groups together activities that are only 
superficially related, since rhythmical language can be used to do radically 
different kinds of thing. Later in chapter 1, he introduces an explicitly non-
standard definition of poetry (1447b13-19), proposing that a subset of the 
activities normally classed as poetry falls under the larger class of human 
activities that are imitative; this subset does form a coherent grouping. So the 
reader’s attention is redirected from rhythmical language (with or without 
melody) to imitation in rhythmical language (with or without melody). Experience 
tells us that a certain set of activities go together (poetry); but our initial, confused 
perception does not tell us with any precision where the boundaries of this class 
are to be drawn. Reflecting on the ‘why’ enables us to see beyond superficial 
                                                 
18 On the responsiveness of the non-rational part of the soul to reason see n.13 above. In the 
passages cited there, Aristotle is concerned with the effect on desire. But it seems plausible to 
suppose that reason gives us new objects of incidental perception: ‘son of...’ is surely not the same 
for humans as it is for vervets (n.5), without an understanding of reproduction. Moreover, 
phantasia must be responsive to the exercise of reason: otherwise, it is difficult to see how intellect 
thinking in phantasmata (n.2) would be distinguishable from the spontaneous interaction of 
phantasmata in non-human animals. 
19 Rotstein (2004). 
20 Gorgias Helen 9; cf. Pl. Gorg. 502c5-7; Symp. 205c.  
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resemblances and draw the boundaries in a way that more accurately reflects the 
underlying structure of the phenomena.21
Secondly, what is tekhnê? Aristotle classes it among the intellectual 
excellences as a ‘productive disposition involving reason’ (ἕξις ποιητικὴ μετὰ 
λόγου, NE 6.4, 1140a9f.). According to the opening chapter of the Metaphysics, 
tekhnê stands to experience as epistêmê does to perception. Experience and 
perception are limited to cognition of the particular and the ‘that’; but tekhnê, like 
epistêmê, involves cognition of the universal and the ‘why’ (Met. 1.1, 981a15-24, 
28-30). We have already noted that empeiria can be acquired by some non-human 
animals, although not to the same degree as humans (Met. 1.1, 980b26f.); by 
contrast, the rational component of tekhnê means that it can be attributed to non-
human animals only analogically (HA 8.1, 588a28-31).  
We might therefore suppose that Aristotle attributes a rational understanding 
of the ‘why’ to successful practitioners of any tekhnê, including poetry. But that is 
not the case. Empeiria is not necessarily less practically effective than tekhnê. It 
may be enough to know the right way to do something, even if one does not 
understand why that is the right way to do it; indeed, empeiria is more effective in 
practice than an understanding of the rationale divorced from experience (Met. 
1.1, 981a12-15). The pronouncements of people with experience are worth taking 
seriously, even when they cannot prove their claims, since the ‘eye’ of experience 
enables them to see things correctly (NE 6.11, 1143b11-14). Accordingly, it is 
clear from the Poetics that poets can produce good poems even if they do not 
understand why those poems are good. The tragedians who discovered that certain 
families provide the best subjects for tragedy were ‘guided by chance rather than 
art’ (Poet. 14, 1454a10-13). A poet who understood what he was doing would 
have been able to select appropriate subjects from the repertoire of traditional 
stories (cf. 9, 1451b23-5; 14, 1453b22-6) by applying an explicit and understood 
criterion; but these poets selected from the repertoire at random, until they learned 
by trial and error to concentrate their efforts on those stories which proved most 
successful in practice. Even at this stage, they may only have been able to 
recognise (directly, or by observing audience response) that these stories worked 
well; they did not necessarily understand why the favoured stories worked well. 
Their success was based on experience, not tekhnê.22 Even more strikingly, 
Aristotle leaves it an open question whether Homer’s ability to construct excellent 
                                                 
21 Perhaps, then, beginning πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων (1, 1447a12f.) should be read in the light of 
the methodological principle stated in EE 1.7, 1217a18-20: we should begin πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν 
πρώτων... οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, and seek clarity; cf. 1.6, 1216b26-35; 2.1, 1220a15-18. However, 
Aristotle uses the formula in various ways (e.g. HA 5.1, 539a5; PA 1.5, 646a4; 2.10, 655b29; GA 
2.4, 737b25). See Quandt (1983). 
22 In one sense the poet does know why he focuses on stories about these families: they elicit a 
better response from the audience. But he does not necessarily understand why these stories have 
that effect. At first he may follow the rule ‘select one of these stories’; then he might progress to 
the more flexible rule ‘select a story like one of these’. But even if he can reliably recognise 
relevantly similar stories, he may still be unable to state explicitly the characteristic which explains 
their success, as Aristotle can. It is a further step again to be able to explain why stories with that 
characteristic are successful. As noted in §1, the depth to which human actions are guided by 
causal understanding is variable. See further n.41 below. 
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epic plots was due to ‘art or instinct’ (8, 1451a19-24). The idea is perhaps that 
Homer had no precedents to learn from in plot construction, and there is no 
evidence of his having produced less successful plots in a trial-and-error learning 
process; therefore, if we suppose that his having an explicitly worked out theory 
of the ‘why’ is anachronistic,23 he must have achieved his success by instinct. 
Natural talent would have made it possible for Homer to recognise that a plot 
worked well, without understanding why it worked. Yet Aristotle clearly thought 
that Homer was reliably good at producing excellent poems, whether or not he did 
so by tekhnê.  
Aristotle accordingly uses tekhnê in two different ways. When his attention is 
focused on issues of cognition, as in the first chapter of the Metaphysics, tekhnê is 
used to define a particular cognitive state—one which involves a rational 
understanding of the ‘why’ of the relevant kind of production. But in contexts in 
which Aristotle’s attention is focused on the products, a different set of 
considerations becomes relevant. According to Aristotle, any particular object—
for example, a house—is a complex of matter and form. The building materials 
existed before the house; what explains the change that converts these building 
materials into an actual house is the builder, or (more precisely) the builder 
building; or (most precisely) the builder’s tekhnê, since ‘a builder builds in virtue 
of the art of building’ (Phys. 2.3, 195b21-5). The builder’s tekhnê is the form of 
the house, without the matter; it is the essence of the house, the rationale of the 
product (λόγος τοῦ ἔργου) without the matter (Met. 7.7, 1032b11-14; PA 1.1, 
640a28-32). Here, therefore, the rational component of tekhnê is defined 
objectively, in terms of the product’s rationale, rather than by reference to the 
cognitive state of the producer. Of course, the producer must be in some suitable 
cognitive state to secure the right outcome, but it need not be the cognitive state 
specified in the first chapter of the Metaphysics: it is not necessary that the 
producer understands the ‘why’ of his production. The form of the product may 
exist in the producer, not as explicit understanding, but implicitly as a set of habits 
and an ability to make reliable but unreasoned judgements—for example, as a 
result of experience or natural talent.24  
Poetic tekhnê, then, has a dual aspect. On the one hand, it can designate a 
product-specification: it defines what makes a poem a good poem. On the other 
hand, it can designate the cognitive state of someone who has a rational grasp of 
that product-specification—someone who understands and can explain its 
rationale. Successful poets do not necessarily possess tekhnê in the latter sense, 
even though tekhnê in the first sense must be present in the poet at least 
                                                 
23 Even when Homer had shown the way, people did not follow his insight (7, 1451a19-22; 23, 
1459a37-b2). His discovery was so subtle that it needed the reflective analysis of Aristotle to 
identify the ‘why’. 
24 It is possible to achieve the same result by these cognitively different routes, because the point 
of production (poiêsis) resides in the product; hence the producer’s cognitive state is external to 
the product. By contrast, in ethical action (praxis) the cognitive (and affective) state of the agent is 
internal to the action: a virtuous action is the right thing done by deliberate choice (prohairesis) for 
the right reason. For this contrast see NE 2.4, 1105a26-33. 
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implicitly.25 Aristotle’s subject-matter in the Poetics is tekhnê in the objective and 
normative sense of a product-specification: that is, the Poetics is concerned with 
what it is the poet’s job to produce, rather than with how poets think or how they 
go about that job. However, what Aristotle aims to achieve in the Poetics is tekhnê 
in the cognitive sense: that is, he is trying to make explicit the ‘why’ of (at least 
some, major) features of the tekhnê that successful poets implicitly embody in 
their talent or experience. That achievement does not depend on Aristotle himself 
possessing that talent and experience. As we have already noted, productive 
ability and a rational understanding of the ‘why’ of that productive process do not 
necessarily coincide (Met. 1.1, 981a12-15).  
3. Imitation  
Poetry is rooted in the human instinct for imitation, and the pleasure which all 
humans take in imitations (Poet. 4, 1448b4-9).26 Aristotle says that humans are 
the most imitative of animals, which implies that (some) other animals are 
imitative in some lesser degree; that is confirmed by the History of Animals (8.12, 
597b23-9; 9.1, 609b14-18). However, when he explains the pleasure which we 
take in imitations, his explanation is formulated in a way that excludes non-human 
animals. He says that when we look at pictures ‘we learn (manthanein) and infer 
(sullogizesthai) what each thing is, e.g. that this is so-and-so’ (b15-17). ‘Learn’ is 
not a decisive obstacle: some non-human animals learn (manthanein: HA 9.1, 
608a17-21, 27; 9.15, 616b11; PA 2.17, 660b1; Met. 1.1, 980b21-5). But inference 
involves reason, and is therefore a distinctively human capacity. The choice of this 
word is not casual: it appears in a parallel in the Rhetoric (1.11, 1371a31-b10).27 
So Aristotle seems deliberately to link the pleasure we get from imitations to 
reasoned inference.  It follows that this pleasure is not available to any non-human 
animal or to human infants. That is consistent with what he has just said about 
infant imitation, since the capacity for imitative behaviour may be separable from 
the recognitional capacity that is in question here. But why should this recognition 
require the ability to make reasoned inferences? We look at a picture and 
recognise ‘This is so-and-so’, because the picture is a likeness of so-and-so. But it 
does not take reasoned inference to recognise a visual likeness: animals can detect 
visual similarity, too. And it is clear from the opening of the Metaphysics (1.1, 
                                                 
25 For modern psychological studies of implicit knowledge see (e.g.) Kihlstrom (1987); Reber 
(1993); Cleeremans et al. (1998); Wilson (2002). For a philosophical perspective: Polanyi (1958). 
26 For present purposes, we can leave to one side the question whether these are the two causes 
which Aristotle mentions in 1448b4f., or conjointly the first of those two causes, the second being 
the instinct for melody and rhythm (mentioned at 1448b20f.): see Tsitsiridis (2005), 435 n.2 for a 
recent overview of this debate. It is, at any rate, clear that the instinct for melody and rhythm is a 
cause of poetry (since the explanation of imitation in melodically and rhythmically elaborated 
language is incomplete without it), whether or not it is one of the two causes referred to initially.  
27 If we had only the passage in Poetics 4, we might speculate that the phrase ‘learn and infer’ is 
logically disjunctive (cf. 23, 1459a37-b1: when Aristotle says that poets other than Homer ‘write 
about a single person, and a single period of time, and a single action of many parts’, he does not 
mean that they do all three at once: these are three alternatives). The phrase ‘learn and infer’ would 
then present perceptually and inferentially mediated recognition as alternative possibilities. But the 
parallel cannot be explained in this way: here the learning is explicitly the consequence of the 
inferring: συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει.  
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980a21-7) that we get pleasure from learning (acquiring knowledge: gnôrizein) 
through sense perception, not just from learning through reasoned inference.28
Clearly, Aristotle envisages something more than the recognition of 
perceptual resemblance. Nevertheless, we should not leap to the opposite extreme, 
as Halliwell does when he says that in this passage Aristotle ‘is prepared… to 
assimilate the general experience of artistic representation to a philosophical 
concept of “understanding,” manthanein’, and complains of scholars who 
‘ignore… the philosophical weight of manthanein kai sullogizesthai’.29 It is not 
true that manthanein specifies a philosophical concept of understanding. Aristotle 
uses this word to denote animal learning (as was noted above), the earliest 
learning experiences of children (Poet. 4, 1448b7f.), and the easy learning which 
everyone enjoys (Rhet. 3.10, 1410b10f.); these are not philosophically weighty. 
Nor does sullogizesthai necessarily carry philosophical weight. Inferential 
reasoning is a baseline human capacity, exercised in the most elementary forms of 
deliberation and recollection (§1). Some instances of inferential learning are 
philosophical and weighty, but not all; and Aristotle is, quite explicitly, not talking 
in this passage about philosophers alone (Poet. 4, 1448b13-15). Aristotle is 
concerned here with the nature of the pleasure taken in all imitations simply as 
such; that pleasure is accessible to all adult human beings, including the least 
cognitively sophisticated. It is crucial to the logic of the argument in context that 
philosophical weight is not a condition of the process Aristotle is describing. It is 
precisely an elementary process of cognition which the argument of this passage 
needs. Nevertheless, it is an elementary process of rational cognition; the 
necessity for that has still to be explained. 
In a stimulating recent contribution, Tsitsiridis has focused attention on 
Aristotle’s observation that ‘if one happens not to have seen the thing before, it 
will not give pleasure as an imitation’ (1448b17f.). He suggests on the basis of 
this reference to prior perception (πρεωρακώς) that Aristotle conceives of the 
recognition as involving (something like) active recollection, which is an 
inferential process (§1): ‘Aristotle interprets the knowledge and the subsequent 
pleasure derived from mimesis by proposing that the mimetic art is based on a 
cognitive process which is related to the function of memory and especially to that 
of recollection.’30 However, this interpretation leaves the requirement of active 
recollection unexplained. There is no obvious reason why the imitation should fail 
to give pleasure as an imitation if the resemblance of the picture to the object 
depicted triggers a non-inferential passive memory. So the specific reference to 
inferential reasoning has still not been adequately explained. 
                                                 
28 Although only humans are mentioned at 980a21, the claim which Aristotle makes is about 
universality among, not exclusivity to, humans. He speaks of animals in general at 980a27f.; 
distinctively human capacities only enter the reckoning at 980b27. The unimpeded exercise of a 
natural disposition is pleasant (NE 7.12, 1153a12-15), and there is good biological reason why any 
animal with a flexible behavioural repertoire needs to be intrinsically motivated to gain 
information about its environment. Non-human animals do in fact find visual (or other forms of 
perceptual) exploration intrinsically motivating: Butler (1965). 
29 Halliwell (2002), 187, 188 n.31 (larger discussion: 186-93).  
30 Tsitsiridis (2005), 443 (original emphasis). Though I have reached different conclusions, I found 
Tsitsiridis’ discussion extremely helpful in understanding the nature of the problem in this passage.  
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A pleasure from learning that ‘this is that’ can be found in Aristotle’s account 
of metaphor, too (Rhet. 3.10, 1410b9-27). Simile gives less pleasure than 
metaphor, in part because it is more extended (cf. Poet. 26, 1462b1f.), and in part 
because it does not prompt a search (zêtein b20). A metaphor will not be effective 
if the point is so obvious as to need no search (b23). But nor should the point be 
so obscure as to defy comprehension: the learning must be swift (b21). What is 
required is a search that finds the solution more or less instantaneously (b24-6).31 
The search, then, is an element in the pleasure; but the search should not be 
taxing: ‘learning easily is naturally pleasant to all’ (b10f.).32 Here, too, we are 
dealing with an elementary process of rational cognition. Does it provide an 
illuminating analogy to the case of imitations? 
A metaphor sets a puzzle, and thus initiates a search; the search is successfully 
completed when we can say ‘this is that’. In Aristotle’s example (3.10, 
1410b14f.), when Odysseus invites Eumaeus to judge the corn from the stubble 
(Od. 14.213), ‘stubble’ sets a puzzle; the search which this initiates is successfully 
completed when we can say ‘stubble is old age’, having identified the similarity 
which explains the substitution of the one for the other. But this highlights a 
difference between metaphor and imitations. The link between stubble and old age 
is a conceptual similarity, the grasp of which plausibly depends on rational 
inference. The link between a picture and the object depicted is a perceptual 
resemblance. We still have no explanation of why that should require rational 
inference. 
What is it in a picture that sets a puzzle and initiates a search? One obvious 
possibility is that a picture’s perceptual resemblance to its object is necessarily 
incomplete. For example, coloured shapes on a two-dimensional surface are not 
perceptually identical to the three-dimensional object depicted. But is rational 
inference needed to bridge that gap? That does not seem a plausible account of 
how we experience looking at a picture. More importantly, there is no theoretical 
basis for this assumption: Aristotelian animals do not require rational inference to 
construct incidental objects of perception out of an array of colours and shapes. 
Moreover, this explanation would work least well for the especially accurate 
pictures which Aristotle chooses to single out in this passage (Poet. 4, 1448b11); 
the perceptual resemblance is presumably maximised in such pictures.33 There is 
therefore little reason, either in principle or with respect to the context, to suppose 
that Aristotle was concerned with the incomplete perceptual resemblance between 
picture and object. 
It may be more significant that Aristotle singles out especially accurate 
pictures of objects that are themselves visually unpleasant (1448b10).34 The logic 
                                                 
31 Compare 3.11, 1412a24-6, b1 (learning is pleasant); 1412a11f. (the connection should not be 
obvious); 1412a32f. (comprehension should be instantaneous). 
32 It is therefore misleading to speak of ‘psychological effort’ (Halliwell (2002), 191) in this 
context: effortful search is not pleasant.  
33 These are at the opposite end of the range from the archaic paintings which would be 
unintelligible without inscriptions identifying what each thing is (Top. 6.2, 140a20-22). 
34 It may be helpful to review the structure of passage’s argument. It starts with a proposition: (1) 
everyone enjoys imitations. The evidence for (1) is that (2) we enjoy even very accurate pictures of 
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of this move is readily intelligible. If one gets pleasure from looking at an image 
because of its visible form, then looking at the thing of which it is an image would 
give the same pleasure (Pol. 8.5, 1340a25-8). Conversely, if something is 
unpleasant to look at because of its visible form, any pleasure we get from looking 
at an image of it will not be due to its visible form. But we do enjoy looking at 
accurate images of things that are themselves unpleasant to look at. By focusing 
on our response to this kind of picture, Aristotle is able to disentangle the pleasure 
that may be gained from a picture’s purely phenomenal attributes from the 
pleasure which it gives qua imitation. A fine painting is not necessarily a painting 
of something fine. Perceptual resemblance makes an easy non-inferential 
transition from the imitation to the imitated object possible; but if we are to 
respond appropriately to the painting as an imitation, the immediacy of that 
transition must be inhibited, so as to ensure that our response to an imitation is at 
least partially dissociated from our response to the object imitated. Perhaps, then, 
rationality is needed, not to overcome the perceptual difference between the 
imitation and its object, but to ensure that we are not misled by their perceptual 
resemblance. 
In Parts of Animals, Aristotle talks of our getting pleasure from observing 
pictures of unpleasant animals, ‘because we are at the same time observing the art 
which crafted them (e.g. the art of painting or sculpture)’ (PA 1.5, 645a8-15). I 
have previously interpreted that passage as referring to an expert critic’s 
appreciation of a painter’s skill, and therefore distinct from the pleasure of Poetics 
4, which is available to everyone.35 That is a plausible account of what Aristotle 
had in mind in a context in which he is urging the close study of unattractive 
animals, with a view to a deep understanding of nature’s craftsmanship. But deep 
understanding must be built on basic understanding. Neither a natural scientist nor 
an art critic can make progress in discerning causes unless they have understood 
that their objects of study are, respectively, products of nature and art; and that 
minimal understanding is shared by non-expert observers. In particular, the ability 
of even the least sophisticated viewers of paintings to dissociate their response to 
the imitation from their response to the object imitated,36 presupposes that they 
understand why the imitation is like the object imitated. They must respond to the 
painting, not just as like, but as an artistically contrived likeness of, the object 
imitated. That provides a solution to our difficulty. Although it is possible to look 
at a picture and recognise that ‘this is that’ or ‘this is so-and-so’ on the basis of 
                                                                                                                                     
unpleasant objects. The explanation for (2) is that (3a) everyone enjoys learning, and (3b) the 
source of our enjoyment of pictures is learning and inferring what each thing is. The defence of 
(3b) is that (4) we do not enjoy the picture as an imitation unless we have seen the object before 
(i.e. unless we are equipped to make the connection between features of the picture and features of 
the object), although (5) we might take pleasure in other aspects, such as the execution or the 
colouring. 
35 Heath (1996), xi-xii; (2001), 21 n.7.  
36 Aristotle does not need to claim that this dissociation is complete, or that it is always achieved. 
His distinction between plots that evoke pity and fear and those that are repulsive (μιαρόν, Poet. 
13, 1452b34-6) indicates one limit beyond which he thinks that dissociation cannot (or ought not) 
be achieved. Recent discussion of ‘imaginative resistance’ has noted that it is very commonly 
(though not exclusively) a moral response: e.g. Gendler (2000), (2006) (responding to the lively 
discussion provoked by the earlier paper); Stock (2005).  
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perceptual resemblance, without inferential reasoning, it is not possible to do so in 
the right way without causal understanding. Thus the appreciation of imitations 
qua imitations requires an exercise of reason—one that is cognitively trivial, and 
therefore available to all adult human beings, but which exceeds the capacities of 
non-human animals, which have no grasp of the ‘why’.  
4. Universality and illusion 
Aristotle has gained some notoriety for claiming that ‘poetry is more 
philosophical and more serious than history’ because it ‘tends to express 
universals, and history particulars’ (Poet. 9, 1451b5-7). Although Aristotle was 
thinking of narrative history (he mentions Herodotus), it may help to clarify the 
issues if we start from the catalogue of Olympic victors that Aristotle compiled.37 
A collection of statements of the form ‘X won competition Y in Olympiad Z’ 
would be a particularly extreme example of historical particularity. But in his role 
as a philosopher, Aristotle was able to spot a pattern in the data, explain the 
pattern, and use the explanation to support an argument (Pol. 8.4, 1338b40-9a4). 
What he spots is that junior victors almost never went on to record a victory in the 
senior competition. That might seem surprising: one would expect junior victors 
to be good athletes, and good athletes to win senior victories. So here is a 
surprising ‘that’, and Aristotle looks for a ‘why’ to explain it. The explanation is 
the damaging effect of excessive exertion on immature physique. That in turn 
supports Aristotle’s argument that in a properly designed educational system 
younger children should be given light exercise, and should not be subjected to a 
strict diet and intensive training.38
If Aristotle is right,39 then placing bets on the intuitively plausible assumption 
that junior victories indicate potential for senior success will prove a costly 
mistake. But imagine someone who regularly attends athletic competitions, and 
backs competitors who have won victories in the past. He has had mixed success; 
but his fortunes improve as he increasingly avoids backing those competitors 
whose past successes were in junior competitions. At first, he does not realise that 
this is what he is doing. He simply follows his hunch in each individual case 
without realising that there is a pattern to those hunches; his recognition of the 
pattern is entirely implicit.40 Clearly, this person is not thinking philosophically. 
But then he becomes more reflective: he looks for a pattern underlying his 
hunches. He notices that he is averse to backing former junior victors, and checks 
the victor-lists to verify the pattern. Now he knows what explains his increasing 
success; he can place his bets more confidently. But he is still not thinking 
                                                 
37 Listed among his works in D.L. 5.26. He also compiled a list of Pythian victors, from which a 
few fragments survive (F615-7 Rose = F410-14 Gigon). [See now P. Christesen, Olympic Victor 
Lists and Ancient Greek History (Cambridge 2007), 170-3 (Olympionikai), 179-202 (Pythionikai); 
texts 369-71, 374-82, cf. 385.] 
38 NE 2.2, 1104a30-3 reflects the normal expectation of a correlation of diet and exercise with 
strength (though see 2.6, 1106b2-5 for the relativity of the mean in such cases).  
39 Maróti (2004) argues that he is not. 
40 On implicit pattern-recognition see (e.g.) Lewicki et al. (1988), and the literature cited in n.25 
above.  
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philosophically, because he is not trying to understand the pattern: he is not asking 
why. There is, indeed, a level at which he has achieved an understanding of a 
‘why’: he knows why he should bet against junior victors—because it is 
profitable; and he knows why it is profitable—because they rarely win senior 
victories. What he is not interested in is why junior victors rarely win senior 
victories.41 He is not committed to the systematic, deep explanatory project that is 
philosophy; and he not concerned with the universal.42  
Aristotle’s point in Poetics 9, then, is that historians are not committed to the 
systematic, deep explanatory project that is philosophy. Thucydides may tout the 
usefulness of observing a probably recurrent pattern in human affairs (1.22.4), but 
he does not explain why the pattern is recurrent. It is not clear that he is even very 
explicit about what that pattern is. He does talk about the war’s ‘truest cause’ 
(1.23.5); but that is just a set of particular statements about this particular war, not 
an explicitly universal statement. Thucydides thinks that a pattern that will (in 
Aristotle’s terminology) necessarily or probably recur is latent in the events he 
describes, but he does not explicitly identify the pattern or explain it. But until the 
pattern is explicitly articulated and explained, what we have is experience 
(empeiria), not philosophy.43 That is not to diminish its usefulness. As we have 
seen (§2), Aristotle recognises that empeiria may be more useful in practice than 
tekhnê. If we are training politicians, theoretical analysis may be less useful to 
them than simply showing them lots of examples in the hope that this will give 
them sufficient experience to enable them to recognise new cases.44  
Aristotle is not talking in this passage about what particular historians may 
happen to have done, but about the job description that applies to historians as 
                                                 
41 Our punter has a fragment of a rudimentary tekhnê: he knows what he should do, and why (Met 
1.1, 981a28-30); and he could teach others the principle (981b8-10). His failure to probe deeper is 
not an objection: the practitioner of a tekhnê can derive its principles from perception or reflection 
(dianoia: PA 1.1, 639b14-19); for example, only the ‘more philosophical’ doctors will have 
recourse to natural science (Sens. 1, 436a17-b1; cf. Resp. 27, 480b22-30). Cf. n.22 above. 
42 When the gambler realises that his hunches relate to junior victors, or when Aristotle discovers 
that it is possible to replace (almost) all occurrences of ‘X won a junior victory’ with ‘a senior non-
victor won a junior victory’, that discloses a pattern in the data that was not previously evident. 
But this only yields a generalisation (which might be coincidental). To establish that it is a genuine 
universal (which requires necessity or probability), one must identify the explanation (over-
training as the factor which connects junior success and senior failure). This is why, in 
distinguishing perception from rational understanding, Aristotle links the particular with the ‘that’ 
and the universal with the ‘why’ (§1).  
43 de Ste Croix (1975), 51f. (= 28f.) argues that the case of Thucydides shows that ‘even on 
Aristotle’s own premises... his disparagement of history... is not fully justified’. But he gives the 
argument away with: ‘One of the most remarkable features of Thucydides’ narrative is that its 
“lessons”... are implicit in the narrative and do not need to be spelt out in the History in general 
terms’—to be philosophy, they do. 
44 Aristotle believes that politicians proceed by capacity (dunamis) and experience, rather than by 
reasoned thought (dianoia), and that experience is essential to those who want to know about 
politics (NE 10.9, 1181a 1-12). Ethnography and history are useful for legislation and political 
advice respectively (Rhet. 1.4, 1360a30-8). He is not, of course, suggesting that a philosophical 
approach, concerned with the ‘why’ as well as the ‘that’, is superfluous in politics: he explicitly 
denies that (EE 1.6, 1216b35-17a10). But in the same passage he emphasises the need for caution: 
people can be misled by specious arguments.  
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such. The historian’s job description does not require more than producing an 
account of what happened. If, unlike Thucydides, a historian were also to provide 
analysis, he would not be doing that qua historian; he would be going beyond his 
role as a historian and doing something philosophical.  
The poet’s job description is more demanding than the historian’s. Why? The 
historian reports a series of events, while the poet constructs a sequence of events. 
And the poet’s construction is subject to a constraint which does not apply to the 
historian’s report: the events must be causally connected. The sequence must be 
not just one thing after another, but one thing because of another, in accordance 
with necessity or probability.45 That is what gives poetic plots their universality; 
and that is what makes poetry—not into philosophy, but into something more 
philosophical than history. 
Note, however, that, as we said earlier (§2), describing the poet’s tekhnê 
specifies the norms governing the product, not the thought processes or 
procedures of the poet. If the universality constraint is satisfied, it does not matter 
how the poet manages to achieve that result. He does not need to understand the 
universality of his plot; that is, he does not need to have any explicit grasp of the 
‘why’ that makes this sequence of events a necessary or probable one. All he 
needs is the ability to recognise that this sequence of events works the right way 
for a tragedy. That can be done by empeiria. So when Aristotle says that poetry is 
more philosophical than history, there is no implication that poets are particularly 
philosophical. Nor need their audiences be: they, too, just need the ability to 
recognise that this plot works the right way. 
Despite his insistence on the principle of universality, Aristotle does not 
believe that it is necessary for the universality constraint to be satisfied in full. He 
takes a consistently permissive attitude towards irrationalities and impossibilities 
in poetry, provided that the poet can prevent them seeming irrational or 
impossible. Likely impossibilities should be preferred to implausible possibilities 
(Poet. 24, 1460a26f.; cf. 25, 1461b11f.). It is perhaps just because an audience 
might be expected to settle for an experience-based recognition that the plot is 
connected, as distinct from a reasoned analysis of why the plot is connected, that it 
can be tricked into overlooking failures of connection. There are various 
techniques by which poets can reduce the salience of an irrationality, so that it 
goes unnoticed by the audience. It can be narrated, rather than being enacted on 
stage in full view of spectators (24, 1460a11-17). It can be kept outside the 
tragedy or narration (15, 1454b6-8; 24, 1460a27-32). The audience’s attention can 
be distracted by other sources of pleasure (24, 1460a35-b5).46 Poets can exploit 
the human tendency to make certain kinds of fallacious inference, such as 
affirming the consequent (16, 1455a12-16; 24, 1460a18-26). Familiar falsehoods 
                                                 
45 Poet. 5, 1449b5f.; 7, 1450b26-34, 1451a12f.; 8, 1451a27f.; 9, 1451a36-b9; 9, 1451b33-52a1; 10, 
1452a18-21; 11, 1452a23f.; 15, 1454a35-b2; 23, 1459a17-30. Cf. Heath (1991). 
46 The example is Odysseus’ arrival in Ithaca in the Odyssey. It is instructive to contrast Aristotle, 
who admires Homer’s skill in concealing the genuine absurdity of this incident, with Heraclides of 
Pontus, who produces an elaborate rationalisation to argue that there is no absurdity: F175 Wehrli 
= F104 Schütrumpf (Porphyry Homeric Questions 2.115.9-117.27 Schrader). See the discussion in 
Heath (forthcoming).   
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will also be accepted by audiences, as when gods are portrayed in accordance with 
traditional stories (25, 1460b35-61a1). Coincidence can be an effective source of 
astonishment, if an apparently meaningful relationship between the two events 
conceals the absence of any genuine causal connection (9, 1452a3-11).47
Aristotle advocates universality, while also maintaining that an impossibility 
is unobjectionable if it helps to achieve the end (25, 1460b23-6). So universality is 
not advocated because it is, in itself, part of what poetry aims at; rather, its value 
to poetry is instrumental. In general, universality helps poetry to achieve its aim. 
But in some cases that aim can best be achieved by a violation of universality. 
Such violations need to be concealed (since an obtrusive impossibility would spoil 
the effect), and poets can achieve concealment by manipulating the salience of the 
impossibility, or by encouraging the audience to make a fallacious inference. Our 
response to poetry involves both perceptual and rational cognition; sometimes, for 
the poetry to work, the rational component must take the form of deliberately 
induced false reasoning. 
5. Conclusion 
Poetry involves both poets and audiences in a complex mix of perceptual and 
rational cognition. These are not easily disentangled, in part because Aristotelian 
perception has an extended cognitive reach, and in part because many exercises of 
reason are cognitively trivial for normal adult humans. Moreover, poetry’s 
effectiveness sometimes exploits the human propensity for fallacious reasoning. 
These conclusions will not reassure those who are anxious lest Aristotle’s 
theory be thought crude, lacking in subtlety, or reductive.48 But the worry is 
misconceived, for two reasons. First, nothing in Aristotle’s discussion specifies a 
limit to the cognitive sophistication possible in one’s engagement with poetry. It 
would be self-refuting if it did, since Aristotle’s own discussion displays a greater 
depth of causal reasoning than it describes. For example, poets exploit and 
audiences engage in fallacious reasoning; but they do not need to identify the 
fallacies, and explain the technical reasons for their use, in the way that Aristotle 
does. When watching a performance, Aristotle may himself succumb to the 
illusions, and gain the pleasure that comes from poetry’s achieving its effect. 
When he analyses the performance, he gets a pleasure analogous to that which an 
expert biologist gets from understanding how and why a natural organism is 
formed the way it is (PA 1.5, 645a8-15). Secondly, as was noted in earlier, it is not 
possible to understand the more cognitively sophisticated forms of engagement 
with poetry without acknowledging the elementary processes on which they rest. 
                                                 
47 Aristotle’s example is the death of Mitys’ murderer (1452a7-9); for an interesting recent 
discussion of this story’s implications for narrative theory, see Currie (2006). Even when poets do 
not resort to this kind of device, the enhancement of emotional impact achieved ‘when things 
come about contrary to expectation but because of one another’ (1452a1-5) exploits a familiar 
human cognitive limitation: we cannot reliably identify an event’s necessary or probable 
consequences in advance. 
48 This concern is evident, for example, in Halliwell (2002), 187. Cf. Gallop (1990), 161: ‘I share 
[Halliwell’s] concern… to dispel any impression that Aristotle’s thought in ch. 4 lacks its usual 
subtlety.’ 
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Aristotle himself was certainly not disdainful of simplicity. The Metaphysics, 
which culminates in a series of astoundingly bold inferences about the eternally 
blissful actuality of divine intellect (Met. 12.7, 9), begins with ordinary people 
looking at things. 
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